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Case Note
IS THERE CONFUSION IN THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS
IN SINGAPORE?
Staywell Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Starwood Hotels & Resorts
Worldwide, Inc
[2013] 1 SLR 489
The wording of s 8(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act - which sets
out the relative ground for refusal of a trade mark application
for a mark that is the same or similar to an earlier mark
registered in relation to the same or similar goods or services
as long as there is a likelihood of confusion - is identical to
that in s 27(2)(b) relating to infringement of a trade mark.
The wording is taken from ss 5(2) and 10(2) of the UK Trade
Marks Act 1994 (which in turn derives from the European
Council Trade Marks Directive). The European Court of
Justice, in its 02 Holdings Ltd v Hutchison 3G Ltd ([2008]
ETMR 55) judgment, drew attention to the important
difference in how the identical words should be applied in the
application and infringement contexts: in the former, the
analysis must assume notional and fair use of the mark by
the applicant in relation to all the goods or services in its
specification; and in the latter, it should take into account
the context of the use by both plaintiff and alleged infringer.
This issue arose in Staywell Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc, and the judge
followed earlier Singapore authorities, which decided that the
wording should be applied in the same way in both contexts.
In this, and a number of other respects, Singapore law now
differs markedly from that in the European Union from
which its law emanated.
David LLEWELYN
Professor (Practice) and Deputy Dean, School ofLaw,
Singapore Management University;
Professor oflntellectual Property Law, King's College London.
I. Introduction
1 Trade mark law has changed fundamentally in many parts of
the world over the past two decades or so, as countries have made it
easier to obtain protection of a trade mark through registration
and have accorded broader protection to trade marks once they are
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registered. Views differ as to whether this is a good or a bad thing:
much depends on one's perspective. To the prospective or actual
proprietor of a registered trade mark, the low hurdles to be overcome to
get registration and the scope of protection, respectively, are positive
developments. On the other hand, to those seeking to find a mark that
someone else does not already claim in relation to some goods or
services, or those on the receiving end of overreaching by trade mark
proprietors, the developments reek of another area of "too many and
too broad" rights in the intellectual property field.
2 In the UK, the "fundamental changes"' were introduced by the
1988 First Council Directive to approximate the laws of the Member
States relating to trade marks2 ("Trade Marks Directive") and the 1994
Council Regulation on the Community trade mark. The developments
have resulted in what Sir Robin Jacob - who as Mr Justice and then
Lord Justice Jacob was probably the best-known trade mark law judge of
recent years, at least in the common law world outside the US - has
described as a "tsunami of trade mark case law" resulting from an area
of law in which "anything can happen".4 On the scope of trade mark
rights under the new regime in Europe, Sir Robin lamented, "[T]he big
brands have persuaded the courts that their trade mark rights should
be more extensive and hence more anticompetitive than elsewhere in
the world."s
3 Many countries outside Europe have adopted many of the
changes and much of the wording in the European Union ("EU")
regime in a general worldwide move towards greater ease of registration
1 This is the description of the impact wrought on the law in the UK that was used
(at para 1-01) by the leading UK practitioners' text on trade marks - David
Kitchin, David Llewelyn, James Mellor, Richard Meade & Thomas Moody-Stuart,
Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names ("Kerly") - in its first edition (Sweet &
Maxwell, 2001; but chronologically the 13th, 107 years after the first by Sir Duncan
Kerly in 1894) after the coming into force of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (c 26) (UK)
and the opening of the Community Trade Mark Office in April 1996. (It should be
noted that the author of this article is one of the joint authors of the 13th (Sweet &
Maxwell, 2001), 14th (Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) and 15th (Sweet & Maxwell, 2011)
editions of Kerly.)
2 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 [1989] OJ L 40/1, as now
codified in Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade
marks [2008] OJ L299/25.
3 European Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 [1994]
OJ L 011/1, as now replaced by and codified in European Council Regulation (EC)
No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] OJ L78/1.
4 James Mellor et al, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell,
15th Ed, 2011) at pv (foreword).
5 James Mellor et al, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell,
15th Ed, 2011) at p vi (foreword).
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of trade marks and a broadening scope of protection for those that
achieve registration. Case law from Australia' to Zambia' confirms this.
4 One country stands out for those wishing a more circumspect
reaction to this headlong rush for "ever more and ever wider":
Singapore. In this country, the judges have remained resolute in their
determination to examine seriously the expansive claims of trade mark
proprietors. What Sir Robin would call "big brands", like Polo Ralph
Lauren, Subway, St Regis, have been sent packing in registration as
well as infringement proceedings. Likewise, what should have been a
penalty kick for the owner of registered trade mark NUTELLA for its
well-known chocolate spread, against the sign NUTELLO used on a
coffee drink with "lashings of nutella"' was won only after extra time
and a judgment of more than 60 pages in the Court of Appeal.!
II. Trade mark law in Singapore
5 Until 15 January 1999, Singapore trade mark law had been
based on the UK Trade Marks Act 1938: o the Trade Marks Ordinance
1938" enacted by Sir Shenton Thomas as Governor of the Straits
Settlements was modelled on the UK Act, that itself was considerably
more amenable to trade mark owners than its predecessor, the UK
Trade Marks Act 1905.12 However, under the Trade Marks Act 1938,
6 For example, the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act
2012 (Act No 35 of 2012) (Cth) (by item 113 of sch 6) amends the Australian
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Act No 119 of 1995) (Cth) to clarify that the presumption
of registrability applies to whether a trade mark application is capable of
distinguishing, thus shifting to the registry the burden of proving that it is not
so capable.
7 For example, see the interesting decision of the Zambian assistant registrar on
11 June 2010, in which the opponent, Eustace Spaita Bobo, unsuccessfully opposed
the registration of a BOBO BEEF label in Class 29 in the name of Yoyo Foods Ltd.
The assistant registrar heard the case as the opponent had asked the registrar to
recuse herself, as she was one of the opponent's spouses.
8 Sarika Connoisseur Cafe Pte Ltd v Ferrero SpA [2012] SGCA 56 at [4].
9 Even the survey carried out by the defendant showed that 30% of those it surveyed
were confused by the defendant's use of NUTELLO into thinking there was some
commercial link with the makers of "Nutella": Sarika Connoisseur Cafe Pte Ltd v
Ferrero SpA [2012] SGCA 56 at [64].
10 c 22.
11 SS Ord No 38 of 1938.
12 Generally, see D M Kerly, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (1908). In
the preface to the 11th edition (1983), Thomas Blanco White QC and Robin Jacob
noted with some regret that they had removed from that edition some of the
historical material as "Kerly's continual harking back to the position under the
19th-century Acts bears some responsibility for the characteristic refusal of some
English Courts to recognise that Parliament has, in the past 80 years, altered the
law of trade marks rather a lot". They also commented, rather presciently, that if a
(cont'd on the next page)
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a registered trade mark was still a property right that was granted
somewhat sparingly: for example, the registrar had an overriding
discretion to refuse registration even of marks that complied with
the requirements for registration in Parts A and B of the register,
respectively, as set out in ss 9 and 10.13
6 Along with much else, that discretion and the division of the
register into two parts went with the passage of the UK Trade Marks
Act 1994, and the 1999 Singapore Trade Marks Act1 likewise has no
such provision or division. Instead, the burden (in a non-legal sense)
has shifted; it is now up to the registry to satisfy itself that there is a
statutory reason not to register, rather than the burden being on the
applicant to persuade the registry as to why the mark should be
registered.1 6 This is only the first of the many "fundamental changes" in
the legislation and the way the whole trade mark registration system
operates, to which the authors of the 13th edition of Kerly's Law of Trade
Marks and Trade Names ("Kerly") referred: indeed, Arden LJ has gone so
far as to say that "one has to start by forgetting the preconceptions of
pre-1994 Act trade mark law"."
7 Section 1(1) of the UK Trade Marks Act 1994 "starts with what
appears to be a fundamental definition of 'trade mark"' which is based
on Art 2 of the Trade Marks Directive, although Art 2 does not itself
define a "trade mark" but instead lays down certain requirements with
European regime were to be introduced, "older British concepts of trade marks will
be mere nostalgia".
13 Trade Marks Act 1938 (c 22) (UK) s 17(2). In Union Carbide & Carbon Corp's
Application (1952) 69 RPC 306, Lloyd-Jacob J held that even if the registrar's
exercise of his discretion was fanciful, the court should not interfere as long as the
exercise was judicial.
14 c 26.
15 Cap 332.
16 In this context, it is respectfully suggested that it is wrong to say, as does Ng-Loy
Wee Loon in Intellectual Property Law of Singapore (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008)
at para 21.3.11, that "[m]arks which are somewhat descriptive of the goods or
services in question are classic examples of marks which would not be perceived
by the public to be indicators of trade source" and therefore lack inherent
distinctiveness: the test under the new legislation, as opposed to the old law, is
whether the mark applied for is devoid of distinctive character (under s 7(1)(b) of
the Trade Marks Act (Cap 332, 2005 Rev Ed) or exclusively descriptive (under
s 7(1)(c)). Therefore such "somewhat-descriptive" marks should be registrable
without need to show acquired distinctiveness, as they are clearly "capable of
distinguishing" and are thus "trade marks" within the s 2(1) definition. It is only by
interpreting "devoid" as something other than its dictionary meaning of "completely
lacking" that this provision can apply to "somewhat-descriptive marks".
17 In West v Fuller Smith & Turner plc [2003] EWCA Civ 48; [2003] FSR 44 at [69].
18 James Mellor et al, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell,
15th Ed, 2011) at para 2-03 1. The equivalent Singapore definition is in s 2(1) of the
Trade Marks Act (Cap 332, 1999 Rev Ed).
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which the mark being applied for must conform to avoid the absolute
ground for refusal contained in s 3(1) (a) of the UK Trade Marks
Act 1994 (which is in identical wording to s 7(1)(a) of the Singapore
Trade Marks Act). 9 This has the unfortunate consequence that the
interpretation of the term "capable of distinguishing" in s 1(1) of
the UK Trade Marks Act 1994 "remains unclear" After a detailed
discussion of different theories, 21 Kerly concludes that the expression
"capable of distinguishing" in s 1(1) :22
... takes account of the fact that marks may not have been used before
an application is filed, but contemplates what must occur when the
mark is used. When a mark is put to use, it must distinguish the goods
and services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.
Hence 'capable of' means 'able to', in the sense of 'if used, it
distinguishes ...' This is what trade marks do (or are supposed to do).
8 In Singapore, Andrew Phang Boon Leong J (as he then was)
unravelled the "skein" 23 in Nations Fitting (M) Sdn Bhd v Oystertec plc,
in which he interpreted the equivalent Singapore provision as requiring
assessment in relation to the goods in question, albeit recognising that it
is a low threshold for an applicant to cross at that stage and it must then
not fall foul of the absolute ground of refusal in s 7(1)(b) of the Trade
19 Cap 332, 1999 Rev Ed.
20 James Mellor et al, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell,
15th Ed, 2011) at para 2-087.
21 James Mellor et al, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell,
15th Ed, 2011) at paras 2-087-2-116, including the "cynic's theory" that there is no
point in trying to make logical sense of the provisions, as they were the result of
political compromise: this is dismissed as "too defeatist" (at para 2-102).
22 James Mellor et al, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell,
15th Ed, 2011) at para 2-100, although it is pointed out at para 2-114 that an
appointed person (Anna Carboni) disagreed (in her OTO (No 0-157-08) (29 June
2008) decision) and considered that "capability of distinguishing" was included in
s 1(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (c 26) (UK) as a filter to exclude signs that
are not capable of functioning as a trade mark for any goods or services, ie, an
evaluation in the abstract.
23 This was the word used by Advocate General Jacobs in Procter & Gamble Co v
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)
[2001] ECR 1-6251 to describe "distinctive character", which runs through Arts 2,
3(1)(a)-3(1)(d) and 3(3) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December
1988 [1989] OJ L 40/1 (and in the UK, through ss 1(1) and 3(1)-3(2) of the Trade
Marks Act 1994 (c 26) (UK)).
24 [2006] 1 SLR(R) 712 at [136]-[137]; approved by the Court of Appeal in Wing Joo
Loong Ginseng Hong (Singapore) Co Pte Ltd v Qinghai Xinyuan Foreign Trade Co
Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 814 at [96]. See also the detailed treatment of this issue
by Ng-Loy Wee Loon in "Trade Marks, Language and Culture: The Concept of
Distinctiveness and Publici Juris" [2009] Sing JLS 508, which analyses the cases in
the light of the policy underpinning the Singapore Trade Marks Act of keeping free
what is publici juris, that "is so important that the registration system ... has seen fit
to put in place a legal bar to distinctiveness [ie, the requirement of a 'capacity to
distinguish'] that is missing in the [law of passing off]" (at 537).
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Marks Act,25 "devoid of distinctive character". It is suggested that this
interpretation supports the conclusion arrived at in Kerly, although it is
contrary to a number of European Court of Justice ("ECJ") judgments
supporting what Kerly describes as the "German theory".26
9 Another fundamental change in the unified EU regime is the
role of the specification of goods or services in respect of which the
trade mark is applied for or granted.27 Under the Trade Marks Act 1938
the rights conferred were strictly limited to particular goods, namely,
those in the specification. Now, the specification of goods is only the
starting point when it comes to infringement, which occurs not only
when there is use of the identical or similar mark on identical or similar
goods or services, regardless of whether they are in the specification or
even in the same class, provided there is a likelihood of confusion,28 but
also where the use is in relation to the same, similar or dissimilar goods
or services when compared to those in the specification if the trade
25 Cap 332, 2005 Rev Ed.
26 See James Mellor et al, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet &
Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2011) at paras 2-093-2-096 for an explanation of the theory, and
paras 2-110-2-115 for the authorities in support of that theory, which contends
that "capability of distinguishing" should be assessed initially in the abstract, and
then under the absolute ground, "devoid of distinctive character", in a "concrete"
fashion in relation to the particular goods or services in the application.
27 In addition, under the European Union regime, the class or classes in which trade
marks are registered is now, in the words of James Mellor et al, Kerly's Law of Trade
Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2011) at para 4-002, "very
largely a matter of administrative convenience" (although it should be noted that
the one area where it is not, is that of reclassification by amendment under s 39
of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (c 26) (UK), as in Altecnic Ltd's Application [2002]
RPC 34 (CA). It is easy to see why the class in which a mark is registered is now
primarily for convenience purposes only when one considers the disparate and
often unrelated goods or services that, in many instances, are contained in a
particular class under the 10th edition of the Nice Classification (World Intellectual
Property Organization, 2011). There can be no assumption that goods are similar
merely because they are in the same class, or that they are dissimilar because in
different classes; for example, Class 9 includes protractors and computer programs,
DVDs and fire extinguishing apparatus - that on no analysis could be viewed as
similar. This should be contrasted with the position in Singapore, where Lai Kew
Chai J stated in The Polo/Lauren Co LP v Shop In Department Store Pte Ltd [2005]
4 SLR(R) 816 at [33]: "It would be a very rare case, if ever, that a defendant could
claim that its products, if listed in the same classification as the plaintiffs, were
not similar."
28 However, it is important to remember that a trade mark right does not confer a
monopoly: in order to succeed in an action under s 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act
(Cap 332, 2005 Rev Ed) in relation to use of a sign on similar goods or services to
those for which the mark is registered, the plaintiff must establish a likelihood of
confusion; likewise, under s 27(3), for a mark well known in Singapore, there is
infringement only if there is use of an identical or similar sign in relation to
dissimilar goods or services if that use is likely to confuse and the interests of the
proprietor are likely to be damaged by such use.
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mark is well known in Singapore and if such use is detrimental to or
takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the earlier mark.
10 This is the first of a number of reasons as to why courts should
be vigilant when considering borderline applications for registration:
once registered, the mark may be used to threaten and, if they do not
give up, sue those using the same or similar mark in relation even to
goods dissimilar to those for which it is registered, and even if there is a
defence. In relation to the latter, it was noted by Jacob J (as he then was)
in Nichols plc v Registrar of Trade Marks:29
The problem with saying 'registration will not harm the public: if a
third party wants to use the mark descriptively he has a defence' is
this: that in the practical world powerful traders will naturally assert
their rights even in marginal cases. By granting registration of a
semi-descriptive or indeed a nearly-but-not-quite completelyo30 J
descriptive mark, one is placing a powerful weapon in powerful hands.
In marginal cases defendants, [small- and medium-sized enterprises]
particularly, are likely to back off when they receive a letter before
action. It is cheaper and more certain to do that than to stand and
fight, even if in principle they have a defence.
11 Another reason was highlighted by the recent Staywell
Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc3
("PARK REGIS/ST REGIS") case where Judith Prakash J allowed the
application to register PARK REGIS for, inter alia, hotel services,
notwithstanding the opposition by the owner of the registered mark
ST REGIS, also for hotel services. When deciding that there was no
likelihood of confusion, the judge considered it important that the
applicant used its mark on four-star hotels whereas the opponent used
its registered mark in relation to six-star luxury hotels: "What is relevant
in this enguiry [as to source confusion] is how both the hotels are
marketed." However, this seems to ignore the fact that a trade mark
proprietor is entitled to use its mark on or in relation to all the goods
and/or services for which it is registered,33 that is, those set out in the
29 [2003] RPC 301.
30 The judge was no doubt thinking here of BABY-DRY [2011] ETMR 829, in which
the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") permitted the registration of BABY-DRY
for nappies. Advocate-General Jacobs said that it was a "syntactically unusualjuxtaposition" of words and therefore as it was not exclusively descriptive it should
be registered. Although the subsequent ECJ judgment in DOUBLEMINT [2004]
ETMR 9 drew back somewhat from this very strict interpretation of the grounds
for refusal, it remains the case that those grounds should be interpreted strictly and
therefore in favour of the applicant.
31 [2013] 1 SLR489.
32 Staywell Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc
[2013] 1 SLR 489 at [40].
33 See to this effect, for example, the judgment of the European Court of Justice in
02 Holdings Ltd v Hutchison 3G Ltd [2008] ETMR 55 at [66]-[67]; applied by the
(cont'd on the next page)
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specification of goods or services,34 and no registered mark may be
infringed by use of another registered mark on or in relation to the
goods or services for which it is registered." Thus, the owner of the
PARK REGIS registered mark is free to use its now-registered mark on
or in relation to luxury hotels notwithstanding the fact that it has not
done so to date. If it were to do so, the only remedy available to the
owners of the ST REGIS trade mark would be to sue for passing off,
a cause of action far more uncertain (and expensive, as it requires
proof of goodwill and actual deception) than that of trade mark
infringement.
12 It is for this reason that, in the EU regime, the relevant test to be
applied under Art 4(1) of the Trade Marks Directive (implemented in
the UK in s 5(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994, which is in terms identical
to s 8(2) of the Trade Marks Act37) for the purposes of an application to
register is to compare the earlier mark as used with the mark being
applied for, taking into account notional and fair use of that later mark
in relation to all the goods or services in the specification,38 and decide
whether there is a likelihood of confusion. Conversely, although the
wording of the infringement provision (s 8(2) of the Trade Marks Act 9
in Singapore) is the same as the registration provision (s 27(2) of the
Trade Marks Act( in Singapore), for the purposes of infringement the
court should take into account the actual use (if any) by the defendant
English Court of Appeal in Specsavers International Healthcare Ltd vAsda Stores Ltd
[2012] ETMR 17, an infringement case in which Kitchin LJ summed up the
position on infringement pithily at [87]: "The sign is not to be considered stripped
of its context."
34 However, not all those in the designated class, unless there is specific wording in
the specification to that effect (with all the consequences that may have in relation
to subsequent claims of non-use); see generally James Mellor et al, Kerly's Law of
Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2011) ch 4.
35 Trade Marks Act (Cap 332, 2005 Rev Ed) s 28(3). Again, the goods or services "for
which a mark is registered" are those named in the specification: thus, if a mark is
registered for "hotel services" it may be used on or in relation to any type of
hotel, not just those it may have been hitherto, without risk of infringing a prior
registration. It is for that reason that the analysis in an application context differs
from that in an infringement action where the later user's actual use must be taken
into account.
36 Of course, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc (owner of the ST REGIS
mark) could also apply for a declaration of invalidity under s 23(3) of the Trade
Marks Act (Cap 332, 2005 Rev Ed), on the basis that the registration should not
have been allowed due to the existence of its prior right, but it has already lost that
argument in the context of an opposition proceeding; therefore it would have to be
very brave (and perhaps foolhardy) to run the same argument again, although the
facts may have changed.
37 Cap 332, 1999 Rev Ed.
38 James Mellor et al, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell,
15th Ed, 2011) at para 9-084.
39 Cap 332, 1999 Rev Ed.
40 Cap 332, 1999 Rev Ed.
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of its sign, as that is relevant to whether there is a likelihood of
confusion. As noted in Kerly:
This may have the consequence that, for example, a tribunal finds that
on the basis of notional and fair use there was a likelihood of
confusion between the earlier and the later mark under s 5(2) [of the
UK Trade Marks Act 1994; in Singapore, s 8(2) of the Trade Marks
Act] and therefore the later mark was refused registration; but another
tribunal later finds no infringement of the later mark under s 10(2)
[of the UK Trade Marks Act 1994] by reason of the circumstances of
actual use of the registered mark and the defendant's mark that the
original tribunal refused to register.
13 Although there is some weak UK authority4 2 that could be used
to support the approach adopted by Prakash J in PARK REGIS/ST
REGIS - which follows, although did not cite, the earlier Court of
Appeal decision of Valentino Globe BV v Pacific Rim Industries Inc4 1
("Valentino") - it is respectfully suggested that that authority is very
much limited to its facts and, more importantly, failed to take into
account (as did Valentino) the critical difference identified by the ECJ in
its judgment in 02 Holdings Ltd v Hutchison 3G Ltd," between a
registration case and one of infringement. In the former, the registry
or the court is engaging in an abstract assessment (although the
distinctiveness of the registered mark may be taken into account),
whereas in the latter, the decision is a contextual one, taking into
account "all the circumstances of that use that are likely to operate in
[the] average consumer's mind in considering the [allegedly infringing]
sign and the impression it is likely to make on him"P- The importance of
understanding the difference is even greater when it is remembered that
most application proceedings begin and end in the registry, and the
assessment is made without the evidence that is normal in proceedings
in the High Court.
41 James Mellor et al, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell,
15th Ed, 2011) at para 9-030.
42 The Lunan Group Ltd v Edwin Co Ltd ("FIORELLI") [2007] RPC 18, a decision of
Alan Steinfeld QC sitting as a deputy Chancery judge, which decided that evidence
of parallel trading "for very many years" was a relevant factor when considering
the risk of confusion between a mark applied for and an earlier registered mark
(at [38]). Although this reasoning is strictly incorrect, on the particular facts of the
case it is understandable why the evidence was taken into account. Note, however,
that in Rousselon Fr&es et Cie v Horwood Homewares Ltd [2008] RPC 30, Warren J
cast some doubt (at [100]) on whether FIORELLI is consistent with the European
Court of Justice judgment in Medion AG v Thomson Multimedia Sales Germany &
Austria GmbH [2006] ETMR 13, another case on the infringement provisions.
43 [2010] 2 SLR 1203 at [16].
44 [2008] ETMR 55.
45 Specsavers International Healthcare Ltd v Asda Stores Ltd [2012] ETMR 17 (CA)
at [87], per Kitchin LJ.
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14 The same judge has handed down other decisions recently that
make it clear that trade mark proprietors should not expect an easy ride
in infringement proceedings as well. In Doctor's Associates Inc v Lim
Eng Wah6 ("SUBWAY/SUBWAY NICHE"), she found the claim that
consumers buying food from the defendant's "Subway Niche" outlets
would be likely to be confused into thinking that there was some trade
connection with the plaintiff to be "hypothetical and speculative". In
the remarked-upon absence of survey or other cogent evidence of
confusion, such as newspaper articles, the judge was not prepared to
find a likelihood of confusion under s 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act."
This is a welcome reminder of the need for trade mark proprietors to
adduce persuasive evidence of a likelihood of confusion; the court is
not going to presume such a likelihood merely because the mark is
registered and someone else has used it or something very similar to it,
either on its own or together with something else to make a composite
mark. Hence, in the Medion AG v Thomson Multimedia Sales Germany &
Austria GmbH48 judgment of the ECJ, it was decided that a composite
mark (THOMSON LIFE, in the case referred by the German court), in
which the earlier registered mark (LIFE) did not retain an independent
distinctive role, should not be presumed to be likely to confuse just
, 49because the whole of the earlier mark was present in the later sign.
15 In this context, the leading case in Singapore is The Polo/Lauren
Co LP v Shop In Department Store Pte Ltd ("POLO") where the Court
of Appeal adopted what has been described as a "three-step approach"51
to finding either an applicant's mark unregistrable under the relative
ground of refusal contained in s 8(2) of the Trade Marks Act52 or a
defendant's sign infringing under s 27(2) of the same Act.
16 First, there must be similarity between the marks (this is a
threshold requirement under both ss 8(2) and 8(3) for registrability, and
ss 27(2) and 27(3) for infringement. Second, the respective goods or
services must be identical or similar. Third, that due to the relevant
identicality and similarity, there is a likelihood of confusion. This
46 Doctor's Associates Inc v Lim Eng Wah [2012] SGHC 84.
47 Cap 332, 2005 Rev Ed.
48 [2006] ETMR 13.
49 In Rousselon Frdres et Cie v Horwood Homewares Ltd [2008] RPC 30 at [92],
Warren J held that the assessment of whether the earlier mark retains an
independent distinctive role in the later sign should be made before answering the
question of whether there is a likelihood of confusion. To elide the two "would be
to answer the question 'Is there a likelihood of confusion' with the answer 'Yes, if
there is a likelihood of confusion', when the answer should be 'Yes, if the earlier
mark retains an independent distinctive role"'.
50 [2006] 2 SLR(R) 690.
51 Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Law of Intellectual Property of Singapore (Sweet & Maxwell,
2009 Rev Ed) at para 21.5.17.
52 Cap 332, 1999 Rev Ed.
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approach followed that used by Jacob J in British Sugar plc v James
Robertson & Sons Ltd," although it differs from the global assessment
test adopted by the ECJ in Canon Kaibushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Inc," in which the second and third questions were answered as
part of the global assessment. However, it should be borne in mind that
the POLO case was one decided under s 27(2)" of the Trade Marks Act"
and, as explained above, though worth reiterating, while most of the
statements made by the Court of Appeal in relation to that provision
apply also to the analysis under s 8(2) of the Trade Marks Act, the
global assessment under the latter provision should not take into
account the actual use by the trade mark applicant but only notional
and fair use:" to do otherwise is to open the door to marks being
allowed onto the register, which may then be used perfectly legitimately
in a way likely to confuse.
17 Importantly, in relation to infringement, the court in Intuition
Publishing Ltd v Intuition Consulting Pte Ltd9 ("INTUITION")
emphasised the point made in POLO:60
It does not necessarily follow from the fact that the registered mark
and the sign, as well as the goods and services are similar that
confusion will automatically arise. If that were intended, s 27(2)(b) of
the [Trade Marks] Act would have provided that where the mark
and sign, as well as the goods are similar, there shall be deemed to
be confusion.
18 Thus, as in the SUBWAY/SUBWAY NICHE case, the court
found, on the basis of "at best only slight" evidence of actual confusion
after co-existence of the plaintiff's registered marks and the defendant's
53 [1996] RPC 281.
54 [1999] RPC 117. As noted in James Mellor et al, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and
Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2011) at para 9-029, there are four
different contexts in which the term "global appreciation" is used in relation to the
Trade Marks Act 1994 (c 26) (UK) (and the Trade Marks Directive (First Council
Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 [1989] 0J L 40/1) or the Community
Trade Marks Regulation (European Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of
26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] 0J L78/1)): in deciding
whether marks are identical under ss 5 and 10(1); whether there is a likelihood of
confusion under ss 5(2) and 10(2); whether there is a link under ss 5(3) and 10(3);
and if so, whether such a link gives rise to unfair advantage or detriment.
55 When Chao Hick Tin JA in Mobil Petroleum Co Inc v Hyundai Mobis [2010]
1 SLR 512 at [89] described it as decided under s 8(2) of the Trade Marks Act
(Cap 332, 2005 Rev Ed), he was in error.
56 Cap 332, 1999 Rev Ed.
57 Cap 332, 1999 Rev Ed.
58 Cf The Polo/Lauren Co LP v Shop In Department Store Pte Ltd [2006] 2 SLR(R) 690
at [28].
59 [2012] SGHC 149.
60 The Polo/Lauren Co LP v Shop In Department Store Pte Ltd [2006] 2 SLR(R) 690
at [25].
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signs for at least five, and in certain cases 12 years, that "any likelihood
of confusion at the relevant dates is merely speculative"." In both cases,
the POLO test was cited and applied rigorously by the court.
19 Once again, it seems that, in the absence of evidence of actual
confusion, it will be difficult to persuade the Singapore courts that use
of an identical or similar sign on identical or similar goods or services is
"likely to confuse", under s 27(2) (a question of law for the judge, which
does not require actual confusion). This is particularly so if there
has been a reasonable period of co-existence before the trade mark
infringement action is brought.
20 In both this respect and in relation to the test to be applied at
the application stage under s 8(2), the Singapore courts have shown
themselves willing to chart a course different to that of many courts in
Europe under the EU trade marks legislation. The European courts have
been far more amenable to protecting trade mark proprietors both
against later applicants and users of identical or similar signs used in
relation to the same or similar goods or services to those for which the
mark is registered. In doing so, those courts in Europe have accepted, as
they were obliged to by the wording of the legislation and the ECJ, that
the EU regime makes it easier to obtain registered trade marks and gives
far broader protection to marks once registered than was true previously
in certain EU member states such as the UK (under the Trade Marks Act
1938), Ireland and Germany (but not in France, which previously had a
deposit system).62 Whether that is the better approach is for others to
decide, but it is one in which, in the view of the author, POLO,
SUBWAY/SUBWAY NICHE, INTUITION and PARK REGIS/ST REGIS
would all have had a good chance of being decided differently, and
NUTELLA/NUTELLO would have had a good chance of being decided
by summary judgment in favour of the owners of the well-known mark
NUTELLA. That, of course, is the joy of trade mark law: everyone can
61 Intuition Publishing Ltd vIntuition Consulting Pte Ltd [2012] SGHC 149 at [86].
62 The trade mark system introduced by the Trade Marks Directive (First Council
Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 [1989] OJ L 40/1) and the Community
Trade Marks Regulation (European Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of
26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] OJ L78/1) in the early
1990s was the result of decades of hard bargaining and compromise amongst the
European Union member states, which had very different trade mark registration
regimes, ranging from the strict search-and-examination systems in the UK and
Germany to the systems in France and the Benelux where it was much easier to get
a registered trade mark. This is the reason why it is no longer appropriate for
English courts to hark back to cases decided before the UK Trade Marks Act 1994.
As was noted in his foreword to David Kitchin et al, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and
Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2005) by Advocate General Jacobs,
"[t] his book reflects a steep learning curve in trade mark law and practice, even
since the last edition in 2001", and by Sir Robin Jacob in his preface to the same
book, "the Court of Justice had to start from scratch".
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have their opinion. Over recent years in Europe, practically any opinion
in favour of more rights and more protection would have been
vindicated by some judgment or another. The same is patently not true
in Singapore.
